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

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Political Diſquiſitions

Proper for

PUBLIC CONSIDERATION

IN

The Preſent State of Affairs.

In a LETTER

TO

A NOBLE DUKE.

LONDON:
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M.DCC.LXIII.

RPJCE

Political Diſquiſitions.

My LORD,

IN Obedience to your Commands, I here ſend your Grace, drawn together into one View, thoſe Thoughts, which I have occaſionally had the Honour to mention in Converſation with you, on the preſent State of Public Affairs.

I dare not flatter myſelf with an Hope of their being of that Conſequence, which your kind Opinion aſſign'd as the Motive for preſcribing me the Taſk. If they can in the leaſt contribute to ſet Matters of ſuch great Moment in a juſter Light, than they ſeem to ſtand in at preſent, my higheſt Ambition will be anſwered.

The only Thing, which I ſhall preſume to ſay, in Reſpect to the Execution of this Attempt is, that I ſhall deliver the Dictates of Reaſon, with the moſt inviolate Regard to Truth, nor ever ſtrive to influence the Judgment of another, by Arguments inconcluſive to my own; and the Voice of Reaſon deſerves Attention, however inſignificant the Perſon, who utters it.

The Cauſes of that univerſal Gloom, which overcaſts the Joy of every thinking, and unprejudiced Man, in theſe Kingdoms, in this Time of apparent Triumph and Happineſs, are theſe: They apprehend, that *the Office of* A PRIME MINISTER *is inconſiſtent with the Principles of this Conſtitution*:—And that *the Manner in which that Office is executed,* AT THIS TIME, *is alſo inconſiſtent with the Principles of good Policy, and the eſſential Intereſts of theſe Kingdoms*.—Apprehenſions, which, if well-founded, muſt be allow'd ſufficient to juſtify the deepeſt Diſcontent.

In Diſquiſitions of ſuch Delicacy, and Importance, it will be neceſſary to recapitulate

tulate many Things, known to your Grace. But this is unavoidable! The Premiſes muſt be laid down, to ſupport the Concluſions drawn, and prevent the Cavils of real or pretended Ignorance.

I ſhall not treſpaſs long, upon your Grace, in proving the firſt Poſition, as it is already given up; the moſt ſpecious Advocates for *the Miniſter*, being forced to confeſs, that "the Term (and conſequent-"ly the Office) is entirely unknown to "our Conſtitution *."

To demonſtrate the Inconſiſtency of this Office, with the Principles of the Conſtitution, it will be ſufficient juſt to ſhew the Nature of it, and trace it to it's Original in other Governments, from which it appears to have been "very improperly borrow-"ed," † among us.

You will obſerve, my Lord, that I uſe the Words of the Writer juſt quoted. I ſhall not only continue to do ſo occaſional-

* *Political Conſiderations at the preſent Criſis.*
† *Ibid.*

ly, but ſhall alſo take the ſame Liberty with his Arguments, as the Method moſt likely to avoid being miſunderſtood; and this I mention once for all, to obviate the Charge of Plagiariſm.

In thoſe unhappy Countries, where Deſpotiſm rules with a Rod of Iron; where the End of Government is inverted; and the People ſeem to have been created only for the Pleaſure of the Prince, *Indolence* and *Pride* dictate to the Latter, to delegate his Power into other Hands, in order to avoid the Trouble of exerting it himſelf, and ſhun every Kind of Intercourſe with his Subjects, that may leſſen the artificial, blind Reſpect raiſed by Myſtery and Diſtance.

Hence the abſolute Monarch almoſt always employs a Perſon to ſtand between him, and his People, who, under the Appearance of delivering his Maſter's Will, too often conſults only his own, and literally enjoys the Sovereign Power in all it's Plenitude; *and this is* A PRIME MINISTER.

With

With Indolence it is vain to reaſon: But would the proudeſt Prince take the Trouble of a Moment's Thought, he muſt ſee that this Indulgence of his Pride diſappoints itſelf. Such a Delegation of his Power is an implicit Acknowledgement of his own Inability to uſe it, which neceſſarily lowers him in the Eſtimation of his own Subjects, and of every Foreign Power with whom he may have Intercourſe.

Hiſtory confirms this by innumerable Examples. The *Emirs* of the *Caliphs* of *Bagdat*, and the *Sultans* of thoſe of *Egypt*, and (to come nearer Home!) the *Mayors of the Palace* to the Kings of *France* ſcarcely left thoſe Princes the Shadow of Sovereign Power; (the laſt diſdaining even a ſubordinate Name, at Length aſſumed that Shadow too, along with the Subſtance, and actually depoſed a Race of Kings, who had long been their Slaves.) And *all theſe were originally* PRIME MINISTERS. And in our own Times, what Figure have the Kings of *Spain* made in *Europe*, from the Reign of

of *Philip* II. to this Day, *under the Government of* PRIME MINISTERS.

The Wiſdom of thoſe, who form'd the *Britiſh* Conſtitution, ſaw this Evil in the ſtrongeſt Light; and being equally attentive to the Honour of the Sovereign, and the Liberty of the Subject, tacitly precluded the Inſtitution of an Office, equally prejudicial to both, by making no Proviſion for it.

An expreſs Prohibition was not neceſſary, as it was clearly implied in the fundamental Principles of the Conſtitution; if it was not rather omitted from Reſpect to the Idea of rational Sovereignty, ſuch as was eſtabliſhed at the Head of this Government; to which it ſeem'd an Affront to apprehend even a Poſſibility of its being capable of ſuch an Errour.

This Cuſtom, therefore, which may be only abſurd in thoſe Countries, where the Will of the Sovereign is the Law of the Subject, and muſt not be controverted, deſerves another Epithet in a Government,

founded

founded on the Principles of Liberty, and where all Power is limited by fixed and known Laws, ſuch as is the Glory of *Britain*, the Birthright of her happy Sons, if they will but know their own Happineſs.

I am aware, my Lord, that to many this will at firſt ſeem a baſeleſs Fabric of my own Fancy; a Theory contradicted by Facts, in numberleſs Inſtances. Argument againſt Fact is certainly the groſſeſt Sophiſtry; but there is alſo no Sophiſm more apt to deceive, than this of concluding from particular Inſtances againſt general Rules.

I am now, my Lord, entering upon a Topic, as difficult, as it is important; but I rely on your Grace's Candour, which will overlook any undeſigned Errour, and judge only from the Purity of the Intention. I can aſſert, with the Confidence of Truth, that there is no Subject of *Britain*, who has a more exalted Notion of the Sovereign Power, as eſtabliſhed at the Head of this Government, than myſelf; and this, becauſe my Notions of it are founded on Reaſon. I reſpect it, becauſe I know it's

Excellence!

Excellence! And if I do not blindly adore it, as the *Indians* do their Idols, for Attributes exiſting only in my own Imagination, I preſume the ſolid Reſpect of Reaſon is a more worthy, and acceptable Offering, than the groundleſs Worſhip of Ignorance.

All the Inſtances of the Delegation of the Power of the Crown, into the Hands of *one Subject*, which have ever been regularly admitted by the other Eſtates of the Government, have evidently received their Sanction from Neceſſity, on ſome *known Incapacity* in the Sovereign to execute that Power himſelf.

The Reaſon of theſe Inſtances, (and I challenge Experience to produce any other!) inconteſtibly excludes the Sovereign himſelf from chooſing the Perſon proper to be entruſted with ſuch a Delegation. Though if it did not, I imagine that the moſt ſanguine Advocates for *the Prime Miniſter* will ſcarcely aſſert any ſuch Neceſſity for one, at this Time.

For

For ſuch unhappy Caſes, it would have been moſt imprudent to attempt making any expreſs Proviſion in the Conſtitution, as the particular Circumſtances muſt determine the Remedy, and the other Eſtates, which are exempt from any ſuch Incapacity, muſt alſo be the proper Judges how to apply it.

As for any other Inſtances, where the Prince has thought proper to commit his Power into the Hands of ſome *favoured* Subject, I think I can ſafely venture to appeal to the whole Tenour of the *Engliſh* Hiſtory, that ſuch a Delegation has never once met the Approbation of the other Eſtates, in ſuch a Manner, as to eſtabliſh a Precedent for the Future; though they may have borne with it for a Time, rather than embroil themſelves with their Sovereign, till ſomething ſhould open his Eyes to the Impropriety of a Meaſure, always unhappy in it's Conſequences. On the contrary, they have never failed to declare their Diſſent to ſuch an Innovation, in the ſtrongeſt Manner; and often have carried it ſo far,

as to obtain the Diſmiſſion of *Miniſters*, who imagin'd themſelves ſo firmly eſtabliſh'd in their Maſter's Favour, as to be above their Reach. Particular Inſtances, therefore, in either of theſe Caſes, (which occur invariably, and in the Latter too often) only prove the Truth of that general Maxim, to which they are Exceptions, *that the Office of* A PRIME MINISTER *is inconſiſtent with the Principles of the* Britiſh *Conſtitution.*

The other Poſition, *that the Manner in which that Office is executed,* AT THIS TIME, *is alſo inconſiſtent with the Principles of good Policy, and the eſſential Intereſts of theſe Kingdoms,* is now to be conſidered.

The Nature of this Part of my Undertaking, makes it moſt diſagreable to me. I diſclaim all perſonal Prejudice againſt the noble Lord, whoſe Conduct I muſt now examine. I admire the Accompliſhments, I revere the Virtues of his Character; and I admit the Favour, with which his Maſter honours him, in ſo eminent a Degree,

to be a Proof of his poſſeſſing them; but ſtill I muſt obey a ſtronger Impulſe, and ſhut my Eyes to every private Regard, that would interfere with my Duty to my Country.

But, at the ſame Time, that I admit this Favour, as an implicit Proof of his Accompliſhments and Virtues, I cannot allow it the ſame Weight to prove his being qualified for the Exerciſe of that great Power, to which it has evidently, and ſolely raiſed him.

The Force of a firſt Impreſſion is ſufficiently known. He who has the Forming of a tender Mind, who will watch it's Motions, and accommodate himſelf to them, may not only give theſe Motions almoſt what Direction he pleaſes, but will alſo eſtabliſh an Aſcendency over the Mind itſelf, hardly ever to be over-turned. An Aſcendency though, that is gained in this Manner, cannot be ſaid to have the Sanction of Judgment: It is litterally *Prejudice*, and is always juſtly looked upon with a ſuſpicious Eye.

I thought it neceſſary, my Lord, to obſerve this, in order to ſhew, that objecting againſt an Influence *thus obtained*, by a Servant, can not juſtly be imputed to Want of due Reſpect to the Maſter. On the contrary, it is an indiſpenſable Duty to uſe every poſſible Means to remove ſuch a Prejudice; a Duty moſt difficult indeed to be performed, as one of the firſt Exertions of that Influence is to poiſon his Mind, with bad Opinions of every one, who might undertake it; and when, by this Management, they are excluded from his Preſence, ſurround him with Perſons, who ſhall ſtop every Acceſs of Information, and keep him, in the moſt unhappy Senſe, "*A Pri-*
"*ſoner to his own Servants.*"

The Conduct of *a Prime Miniſter* (to follow the preſent Mode, and admit the Execution of an Office, acknowledged to be illegal!) is to be conſidered in two diſtinct Points of View; that is, *with Reſpect to his Management of Affairs with other Powers, and at Home*: Or, as I may ſay, *his foreign* and *domeſtic Policy*. I ſhall begin

gin with the former; but in order to make a proper Judgment of it, it will firſt be neceſſary to look back for a Moment to the Situation of Public Affairs, when the preſent *Prime Miniſter* took the Management of them entirely into his own Hands.

At the Acceſſion of his preſent Majeſty to the Throne, *Great Britain* was engaged in the moſt extenſive War it had ever waged. That War was carried on, in all its Extent, with a Succeſs ſcarce to be paralleled in the Hiſtory of any Nation. The Government and the People were united by a mutual Confidence, which (humanly ſpeaking) enſured the Continuance of that Succeſs. The former planned the greateſt Enterprizes, ſecure of the Support of the latter; as theſe poured out their Wealth for that Support, in a Manner not conceived to have been poſſible, till it was proved ſo, equally ſecure of it's being applied to the beſt Purpoſes. The Naval Power of the Enemy was deſtroyed; their Trade ruined; their Colonies all conquered; and the Spirit of the People broken, by the Weight of an unfortunate War: All which Succeſſes were

obtained

obtained under the Conduct of a *Miniſtry*, where the Power was *conſtitutionally divided*; and every Servant of the Crown, really executed the Buſineſs of his own Department, without being ſubject to the Command of any other Perſon, beſide his Sovereign. There remained only to preſerve in the Cabinet, that Superiority which had been gained in the Field, and eſtabliſh the Advantages of ſo glorious a War, by a firm and judicious Peace; the Terms of which, it is natural in ſuch Circumſtances to conclude, muſt have been in the Power of the Victors to preſcribe.

In this Situation Affairs ſtood, when the Favour of the Sovereign offered the ſole Management of them to the Ambition of the preſent *Prime Miniſter*.

To prepare the Minds of the People for a Change, which, however high his Opinion might be of himſelf, he muſt foreſee would alarm them; it was judged neceſſary to arraign the Meaſures of *the Miniſtery* then employed, and brake, if poſſible, the Confidence placed in them.

For

For this Purpoſe, a moſt ſpecious Attack was made upon a particular Part of the War*; in which the moſt diſingenuous Art was exerted to blazon every Objection to it, in the higheſt Colours, and place every Argument in it's Favour, in the moſt diſadvantageous Light.

It has ever been the Method of Faction to aim at ſome particular Part of a Syſtem, without attending to it's intimate, and, perhaps, inſeperable Connection with the Whole! I ſay, my Lord, of *Faction*; for any Scheme of Politics, which is carried on againſt the real Intereſt of the Nation, literally deſerves that Name, whatever Authority may be proſtituted to give Sanction to it.

A particular Diſcuſſion of the Motives for entering into the War in *Germany*, would lead me beyond the Limits of this Letter. I ſhall therefore only obſerve, that it appeared at the Time to be undertaken on Principles of good Policy, by the

* *Conſiderations on the* GERMAN WAR.

unanimous

unanimous Approbation it received from all the Eſtates of the Government; as the People, *who are never miſtaken in their own Intereſt*, were ſo well convinced of the Advantages reſulting from it, that all Attempts to prejudice them againſt it, and brake their Confidence, confirmed by Experience, in the Abilities and Integrity of *that Miniſtry*, proved in vain.

I am not afraid, My Lord, to ſay, *the Advantages reſulting from the War in Germany*, unfaſhionable as the Phraſe is endeavoured to be made at preſent! They were repeatedly acknowledged by both Houſes of Parliament, and authenticated from the Throne, by the Voice of him, who never deceived his People: And it will require ſomething more than ſpecious Arguments, and poſſitive Aſſertions, to over-turn in the Opinion of the Candid, a Credit ſo firmly eſtabliſhed.

The Arguments, urged on this extraordinary Occaſion, were a general Inſult upon the whole Nation. They accuſed the People of Folly, their Repreſentatives

of

of Proſtitution, and the late King (of Memory ever dear to *Britain*) of Weakneſs, Partiality to his *German* Dominions, and Breach of public Faith; and this in Terms which raiſed the honeſt Indignation of every *Britain*, who knew the Virtues of his Heart, and had a Senſe of Gratitude for the Bleſſings of his Reign.

But though this Attempt failed, the Luſt of Rule *(cacoethes dominandi)* could be reſtrained no longer.

From a ſincere and prudent Deſire to avoid the Burden of another War, the Partiality and Inſults of *Spain* had been borne, till it would have been Weakneſs to bear them any longer. In theſe Circumſtances it was propoſed, with a Spirit, truely *Britiſh* to declare War againſt the *Spaniards* directly, and attack them in a Manner that would have ſoon brought them to Reaſon.

Every Law of Nature, and of Nations, juſtified this Counſel. *Spain* had been the Aggreſſor in numberleſs, and moſt flagrant Inſtances; and this Return would have

been conſidered as no more than what was conſiſtent with the Dignity of the People ſo provoked.

But *the Perſon* who gave this Counſel, and who from his great Abilities was reputed to take the Lead in *that Miniſtry*, was to be oppoſed at any rate; and this was looked upon to be a favourable Occaſion, as it afforded an Opportunity for making an oſtentatious Diſplay of Oeconomy, Prudence, and Juſtice. The Scheme was ſucceſsful! The greater Part of *the Miniſtry* acceded to ſuch ſpecious Reaſons, and the propoſal was rejected.

The Motives of this Oppoſition could not eſcape the Penetration of him againſt whom it was levelled. He reſigned an Office, in which he found he had no longer any Authority, as did alſo the noble Perſon *who alone had ſupported his Opinion*; and that Power, which before was conſtitutionally divided between *many*, was immediately united in the Hands of ONE, who now abſolutely *governed* thoſe, who had affected to take the higheſt Offence,

at

at the other's preſuming to *guide* them. I ſay, my Lord, of *One*, for though ſome of the former *Miniſtry* were permitted to Retain their Places a little longer, it is well known, that from the Moment of that Reſignation, they loſt all Power, and were in reality no more than Cyphers, in their ſeveral Offices, without any Importance of their own, but barely to add to that of their new Leader.

The apparent Motives for the Oppoſition which had produced this Change, were ſoon beheld in a proper Light. The Treaſure, which *Spain* expected from the *American* World, arrived in Safety, and the Neceſſity for diſſembling her Deſigns being, by that Means, removed; ſhe pulled off the Maſque, and avowed the Injuſtice ſhe had committed in Terms of Inſult, peculiar to the Haughtineſs of that vain-glorious Nation.

On this it was impoſſible for the new *Prime Miniſter* to avoid declaring War againſt the *Spaniards* any longer: But the proper Moment had been let ſlip; and

thoſe Treaſures, which, in Purſuance of the firſt Propoſal, would have been intercepted and turned againſt themſelves, were now in their Hands; and not only enabled them to make better Preparation for the War; but what was more immediately prejudicial to *Britain*, to afford that Aſſiſtance to *France*, which had been her Motive for drawing *Spain* into the War; and without which, ſhe would have found it extremely difficult to have continued it any longer.

Though Neceſſity compelled *the new Miniſter* to give this Teſtimony to the ſuperiour Judgment of the Perſon, whom he had thus wormed out of his Way, he thought himſelf obliged to deviate from his Meaſures, in ſomething, to ſave Appearances.

Conſiſtently therefore with his Profeſſions of Oeconomy, and the Sentiments he had ſo publicly declared of the War in *Germany*, the firſt Exertion of his Power was, to diſcontinue the Treaty of Subſidy with the King of *Pruſſia*.

It is wrong to antedate Misfortune, by gloomy Apprehenſions; I ſhall not therefore enlarge upon the Conſequences of this Meaſure, though Reaſon cannot look forward to them, without the moſt anxious Boding.

The ſame prudential Reaſons, which were given for this Deſertion of the King of *Pruſſia*, were alſo alledged for entering immediately into a Treaty of Peace with *France*; which was now become as neceſſary to *the Prime Miniſter* to ſupport him in his Power, as it was to the Enemy, under all their Loſſes. For he ſoon had the Mortification to find that the Confidence of the People, which had ſupported the *late Miniſtry* ſo liberally; and was ſtill ready to ſupport them, was denied to him; and therefore he *prudently* reſolved to make a Peace, rather than hazard his Credit in attempting to raiſe the Supplies, neceſſary for carrying on the War; at the ſame Time that he attributed this Diſinclination in the People, which aroſe from perſonal Diſlike to himſelf, to their Inability; and with equal Candour and public Spirit, ſtrove to conceal

his

his own Diſgrace under the Appearance of his Country's Ruin; without any Regard to the Conſequences, which muſt neceſſarily attend ſuch a Repreſentation. It is unneceſſary to make any Remarks on this Conduct. Reaſon and Indignation will ſuggeſt them too ſtrongly.

Between Parties ſo diſpoſed, a Treaty was eaſily ſet on Foot, in which *the* Britiſh *Prime Miniſter* was ſo far from *preſcribing* the Terms, as it may be preſumed he had it in his Power to do, that he met the *French* more than Half-way, ſending a Miniſter to their Court, to treat with them, *as if they were Conquerours, and* BRITAIN *under a Neceſſity of begging Peace.*

There are certain Points of Ceremony, which, however inſignificant in themſelves, Cuſtom has made of real Conſequence, by the Ideas annexed to them. One of the moſt important of theſe is the Method to be obſerved in treating of Peace, as it affects, in the ſtrongeſt Manner, the Reputation of the Parties concerned; and in

all

all Matters, which relate to War, *Reputation is an artificial Strength.*

For this Reaſon it is an eſtabliſhed Rule, between Powers, who treat upon equal Terms, that the Advances made by all ſhall be equal; therefore the Expedient of Meeting at an indifferent Place, out of the Territories of both was appointed, where an evident Superiority did not give one of the Parties a Right to inſiſt upon treating at Home.

There can few Inſtances be alledged, where this Right was more indiſputable, than in the preſent Caſe, for having the Treaty carried on in *England.* The Honour of the Nation required it; and the great Advantages of treating on the Spot, where immediate Advice could be had on any Difficulty that might ariſe, and *could correct, before it was too late, any Miſtakes which might be committed,* made it an indiſpenſible Duty to inſiſt upon that Honour. I mention not Caution againſt undue Influence, though Prudence will guard againſt the moſt improbable Dangers.

But

But inſtead of inſiſting upon this Right; inſtead of appointing even an indifferent Place, where the Diſadvantages of Diſtance from their reſpective Courts, ſhould be equal to the Miniſters of both, a Miniſter was ſent from *Britain* to *France*; the inequivalent Formality of letting the *French* Miniſter at leaſt come over to *England*, as ſoon as the *Britiſh* went to *France*, being alſo neglected, and the latter going thither firſt. Nor was this occaſioned by any unforeſeen Accident. It was agreed to be ſo; as a Proof of which, the very Veſſel, which carried over the *Britiſh*, was appointed to bring back the *French*, Miniſter.

With the ſame Eagerneſs were the Preliminaries of Peace ſigned; though, perhaps, not quite ſo ſoon, as could have been wiſhed by thoſe who ſigned them; and as they would have been, could the Pride of *Spain* be prevailed upon to quicken it's Pace.

To prove this, it *is* ſufficient to obſerve, that the *Britiſh* Miniſter ſet out for *France*, at a Time when an Account of the Conqueſt

queſt of the *Havannah* was expected every Hour; and when the Situation of Affairs in *Germany* and *Portugal*, made ſpeedy Accounts of other important Succeſſes morally certain; and though the Conqueſt of the *Havannah* was (through the dilatorineſs of the *Spaniſh* Miniſtry) known before the Preliminaries were ſigned, yet the *Britiſh* Miniſter was too generous to take any Advantage, or riſe in his Demands on that Score; for the Evacuation of *Portugal* was agreed upon before; and the *Ceſſion* of *Florida*, which it was not in the Power of *Spain* to hinder the *Britiſh* Forces from taking Poſſeſſion of, whenever they pleaſed; and whoſe Value, in Compariſon with that of the *Havannah* is below the Reach of Computation, deſerves not to be mentioned; as he was alſo too eager to finiſh the *bleſſed* Work of *Peace-making* to wait for an Account of the other great Events, which happened critically at that very Time; and had they been known, might have merited Attention; at leaſt they would have made ſome Part of the Preliminaries unneceſſary to be inſerted; and obliged the *French* to look out for other *Equivalents*

to give in Return for the Places reſtored to them, if any ſuch ſhould be required.

Theſe Events were the Reduction of *Caſſel*, by Prince *Ferdinand*, before whom the *French* were retreating out of *Germany*; and the Diſappointment of the Attempt of *Spain*, and *France*, upon *Portugal*, where their Progreſs was ſtopp'd, and their Army obliged to turn back, naked, ſtarving, and greatly diminiſhed by Death and Deſertion, the Conſequences of theſe calamitious Circumſtances: (I have not mentioned the taking of *Schweidnitz* by the King of *Pruſſia*, and the Defeat of the *Saxon* and *Imperial* Armies, by Prince *Henry*, his Brother, as the Affairs of that Monarch may be thought to have no very great Weight with the *Prime Miniſter*;) but by this judicious Haſte, all Difficulties which might have ariſen on theſe Events, were avoided.

If it be ſaid that the indiſcriminate Reſtitution of whatever Conqueſts ſhould be made by the *Britiſh* Forces, then ſent againſt the *Spaniſh* Settlements, was the

Baſis

Baſis of the Treaty entered into with *Spain*, and the Evacuation of *Portugal* agreed to on that Account; and therefore that the Taking of the *Havannah* could not juſtly make any Alteration in the Preliminaries, I apprehend it will be difficult to reconcile ſuch an Anticipation of Succeſſes purchaſed at ſo great an Expence of Blood and Treaſure, to the Steadineſs and Reſolution, indiſpenſibly neceſſary in the Conduct of public Affairs, or the whole Expedition to the Principles of Humanity and Oeconomy, of which ſuch pompous Profeſſions were made.

If no more was really meant by the Expedition, than a Parade, *in terrorem*, ſurely it ſhould have been directed againſt ſome Place, naturally leſs deſtructive to the Lives of *Britons*; or at leaſt, if this Place was unavoidably pointed out by the general Voice of the People, it ſhould not have been delayed to ſo deſtructive a Seaſon; and a proper *Hint* ſhould have been given to the Commanders to conſume the Time in Preparations, till it ſhould be too late to make an Attack, in which ſo much Blood

muſt be ſhed to no national Advantage; and if the Commanders, who were ſent, were thought improper to be entruſted with ſuch an Hint, or to execute ſo *humane* a Commiſſion, *from the Character of the Perſon, who recommended them*, Experience would readily have directed them to others, who had given eminent Proof of their Abilities, in ſuch Warfare, and who were perſonally not diſagreeable to *the Prime Miniſter*.

The melancholy Returns from the Fleet and Army, ſent upon this Occaſion, abundantly prove the Juſtice of this Remark.

I ſay, My Lord, *to no national Advantage*, for the Treaſure taken is private Prize; and as to the Damage done to the Enemy, I fear it will be found to be overballanced, by the Loſſes of the Conquerours, in this fatal Affair; eſpecially as the Fortifications, the Reduction of which occaſioned ſo great a Part of that Loſs, were given up without demoliſhing. Had they been treated like thoſe of *Cherburgh*, in the *late Miniſtry*, (and it does not appear that there

there was any more Deſign of retaining one, than the other;) or as the *Britiſh Miniſter* complaiſantly agreed to treat our's at *Honduras*; the Stroke would have been of Conſequence, and required Time to repair it, in which *Britain* might have eſtabliſhed herſelf in the Poſſeſſion of her important Acquiſition of *Florida*:—*if it ſhould be found upon Experience to be her Intereſt to retain it?*

To the ſame peaceful Haſte it muſt alſo be attributed, that in Return for interfering ſo effectually in Favour of *Portugal*, as to ſave her from Ruin, otherwiſe inevitable, there were no commercial Advantages demanded, which in ſuch Circumſtances could not have been refuſed by the *Portugueſe* themſelves, nor taken Exception to by any other Nation; and which the Generoſity of *the Prime Miniſter* had ſcorned to ſtipulate for at firſt; if indeed he ever thought of them at all! But all the Return to be made for ſo great an Aſſiſtance, and at ſuch an inconvenient Time, is left to their Gratitude and Honour, the very Points, in which *Britain* had too juſt Rea-

ſon

ſon to complain of them, before this Event, not being yet adjuſted.

As to the Preliminaries, they have been ratified by the King, whoſe indiſputable Prerogative it is to make War, and Peace; and they have been approved in the great Council of the Nation, wherefore I ſhall not preſume to enter into any Diſcuſſion of them.

One Thing, though, I muſt beg Leave to Remark to your Grace, which the *Prime Miniſter*, in his great Haſte, ſeems to have forgot; and this is, that the Liberty of *fiſhing* and *drying Fiſh*, on the Coaſts of *Newfoundland*, which was given to the *French*, by the 13th Article of the Treaty of *Utrecht*, and is now confirmed to them by the 13th Article, of theſe Preliminaries, *(of Paris,)* was alſo *the 13th Article, in the Impeachment of the Earl of Oxford, the* PRIME MINISTER, *who made that Treaty, and for making it, was impeached of High Treaſon, by the Commons of Great-Britain; though it had been approved of by two ſucceſſive Parliaments; and the*

Principles

Principles of that Houſe of Commons, who voted that Treaty prejudicial to the Intereſt of Great-Britain, and impeached him for making it, will, as I imagine, ſcarcely be called in Queſtion, by any Friend of THE HOUSE OF HANOVER.

I muſt alſo obſerve, My Lord, that it is moſt unjuſt to aſſign a Fear of encreaſing the Debt of the Nation, by the Expence of continuing the War, as a Reaſon for being in ſuch haſte to make a Peace; and at the ſame Time, by that very Peace, give up Advantages obtained in the War; the Retention of which, would not only reimburſe that Expence, but alſo put it out of the Power of the Enemies of *Britain*, to involve her in the like again.

I ſhall here, My Lord, conclude my Remarks on the *foreign Policy* of the *Prime Miniſter*, which was the Point of Veiw, I propoſed to conſider it in firſt. I have ſtated Facts fairly; and traced them to their Motives, with the moſt impartial Regard to Juſtice; and the Concluſion is obvious.

Into

Into the other Part of his Conduct, *his domeſtic Policy*, I ſhall not attempt to make ſo minute an Enquiry. It is for many Reaſons, a moſt ineligible Taſk. I ſhall, therefore, only propoſe a few general Queſtions, to which every Reader's own Knowledge will ſuggeſt ſuch Anſwers, as ſhall direct his Judgment.—

—Has the preſent *Prime Miniſter* always paid proper Reſpect to the ſeveral Branches of the Royal Family, and never preſumed on the Support of preſent Favour to give them Offence?——

—Has he ever inſulted the ancient and ſuperiour Orders of the Nobility, by an affected Familiarity with their Sovereign?--

—Has he ever, to indulge a private Reſentment of his own, removed any of the Servants of the Crown of proved Abilities and Integrity?—

—Has he ever ſhewn any Partiality in the Diſtribution of Offices, or filled all

Places

Places of Honour and Profit, with his own Dependants, making an implicit Attachment to himſelf, the only Means of obtaining his Maſter's Favour ?——

—Has he ever made an oſtentatious Diſplay of Oeconomy, in Trifles, diſgraceful to Royal Dignity, and at the ſame Time, laviſhly applied the Revenues of the Crown, to eſtabliſh his own Intereſt ?——

—Has he ever trampled on the long and faithful Services of any Rival, or made his Maſter appear Ungrateful, to gratify his own Ambition ?——

—Has he ever hired proſtitute Writers to defame the moſt ſacred Characters ?—

—Has he ever attempted to eſtrange his Sovereign from his Subjects, by repreſenting their Diſapprobation of the Miniſter, as leveled at the Maſter ?——

And laſtly, if he ſhould find himſelf hated by the Univerſal People, has he that Fidelity to his Sovereign, that real Regard

to his Intereſt, to reſign his obnoxious Office, and not run the Hazard of injuring him in the Affections of his People, by ſupporting *a Miniſter* againſt their Judgment?——

A Miniſter, who cannot lay his Hand upon his Heart, and Anſwer theſe Queſtions to the Satisfaction of the People, muſt be condemned by his own Conſcience, and given up by his moſt ſanguine Advocates.

Having thus, My Lord, proved the Juſtice of the Objections *to the Office of* A PRIME MINISTER; and *to the Manner of it's Execution,* IN THE PRESENT INSTANCE, I ſhall now lay before your Grace, one of the ſtrongeſt Nature, which is made to *this Miniſter perſonally*, by the univerſal Voice of the People, and *this is his being* A SCOTCHMAN.

There is no Man more ſenſible of the general Injuſtice of national Prejudices, than I am; however, as there is no Rule ſo general, as to be without ſome Exceptions, I ſhall ſhew the Grounds on which ſuch

an

an Exception is made in this Caſe, and ſubmit it to the Deciſion of Reaſon, whether it is not ſtrictly juſt.

It will be neceſſary, My Lord, on this Occaſion, to look back to the Commencement of our Hiſtory; but this ſhall be done with the greateſt poſſible Conciſeneſs.

It is known, that from the earlieſt Accounts of the Iſland of *Great Britain*, there ſubſiſted an hereditary Animoſity between the Inhabitants of the *Southern* and *Northern* Parts of it. This aroſe from the inſatiable Rapacity, and Ravages of the barbarian Invaders, who had eſtabliſhed themſelves in the latter, and from whom it has taken it's Name.

After the Seceſſion of the *Romans*, the Invaſion of theſe *Scots*, gave Occaſion to the Conqueſt of the *Southern* Part of the Iſland, by the *Saxons*, who were called by the Inhabitants, to their Aſſiſtance.

When the *Norman* Monarchy was eſtabliſhed on the Ruin of the *Saxon*, the *Scots*, animated by the ſame Principles, but ſenſible of the Diſparity of their Strength, and apprehenſive of the Vengeance due to their paſt Conduct, immediately entered into the cloſeſt Alliance with the *French*; an Alliance dictated by Reaſon for their mutual Advantage.

The Aſſiſtance of *France* was indiſpenſibly neceſſary to preſerve *Scotland* from falling under the Subjection of her too powerful Neighbour *England*; as the Aſſiſtance of *Scotland* was alſo of the moſt eſſential Service to *France*, in the Wars, which the latter was almoſt conſtantly engaged in, with *England*: And accordingly as ſoon as ever *England* attacked *France*, the *Scots* never failed to invade the former, with all their Force, and commit the moſt horrid Ravages, till they were repelled, in order to make a Diverſion in Favour of *France*, by which Means many an important Enterprize of the *Engliſh* was diſappointed.

Senſible

Senſible of the Importance of this Service, the *French*, to confirm the Attachment of ſo uſeful Allies ſtill more ſtrongly, granted Honours to the *Scots*, above any other People in *Europe*. The immediate Guard of the King's Perſon was entruſted to them, in Preference to the Natives of the Kingdom.

On the Acceſſion of the King of *Scotland* to the Throne of *England*, the public Effects of this Alliance ceaſed of Courſe; but that the Inclinations of the *Scots* remain'd unaltered was too ſtrongly proved, by the Readineſs with which they entered into the Shemes of *France*, to embroil the unhappy Son of that King, with his People of *England*, though he was their natural Sovereign, and born among themſelves; as their Conduct through the three ſucceeding Reigns ſhewed them ſteady in the ſame Principles.

A Deſire to be delivered from the Trouble of Watching ſuch a dangerous Inmate, made the Miniſtry of Queen *Anne* labour to bring about an Union, between the two Kingdoms, in Hopes that the evident and

great

great Advantages, which the *Scots* muſt reap from it, would conquer their Prejudices, and bind them firmly to *England*.

How well theſe Hopes were anſwered, the Events of the Years *fifteen* and *forty-five* are a ſufficient Proof. If it be objected, that the *Scots* have behaved in a different Manner, during this War, it muſt be remembered, that almoſt all, who were able to bear Arms, and conſequently to give Diſturbance, were taken into the Service of *England*, and ſeparated in her different Fleets and Armies; where the much greater Numbers, among whom they were mixed, may *poſſibly* be thought to give an Appearance of Neceſſity to the Fidelity of a People, whoſe characteriſtic Virtue is Prudence.

I do not mean to inſinuate, that every Individual of the *Scotch* Nation is ſtill actuated by the ſame Attachment to *France*. Many of them have nobly proved the contrary by their Actions; many, very many more have profeſſed it; and all have been well rewarded.

But

But ſtill, My Lord, the People of *England* think that prudential Reaſons require a longer Time of Probation; that Half a Century is not ſufficient to eradicate Principles confirmed by many Centuries; and in a Nation (to it's Honour) remarkably tenacious of its Principles; and that at leaſt the Generation, which ſaw them a diſtinct People, ſhould paſs away, before they ought to be entruſted with the Government of thoſe, whom they themſelves may poſſibly have been taught to eſteem their Enemies; as their Anceſtors for very many Generation moſt certainly did; and eſpecially at a Time, when the Intereſt of *England* and *France* are in a Balance, to which the leaſt Breath of that national Bias may give a Turn moſt eſſentially prejudicial to the Former; a Bias ſtill endeavoured to be kept up by the *French*, who continue the ſame Honours to the *Scotch* Nation, which were conferred upon it, when in a Capacity of ſhewing its Gratitude in a more open and direct, though not more dangerous, Way, than it now can.

For

For this Reaſon, it is the Senſe of the univerſal People of *England*, that even if there muſt be *a Prime Miniſter*, the *Preſent* is a moſt improper Perſon for that great Charge.

I muſt not, My Lord, from this Reſearch, be charged with attempting to revive a deadly Feud, and renew Animoſities, happily effaced! The Impatience ſhewn by the univerſal People of *England*, at being ruled by a *Scotſman*, too plainly proves, that this has been done already by the *imprudent Ambition*, which gave Riſe to theſe Diſquiſitions; and, it is to be feared, that to cool the Heats raiſed on this Occaſion, and reſtore that Cordiality which began to ſubſiſt between the two Nations, before this Event, muſt be the Work of much Care, and a conſiderable Length of Time.

I Repeat, My Lord, *the univerſal People*; for though the Senſe of *the Majority* is *legally* the Senſe of *the Whole*, in this Caſe, that Majority is ſo great, as entirely to drown every Murmur of Diſſent, it being

ing a moſt inconteſtible Truth, that if the Sentiments of every *Engliſhman* alive, who is not evidently influenced by Motives of private Intereſt, were to be taken this Day, *Ninety and Nine in every Hundred, would be found to deſire the Diſmiſſion of the preſent Miniſter*; and it is to be hoped that the Voices of any other People, however incorporated among them, and Ambitious of ſharing in their Rights, ſhall never have more Weight in *England*, than is given them by that Union, which gives them any Weight in it at all.

I will grant that he has all the Abilities, ſo laviſhly aſcribed to him by his intereſted Retainers; yet ſtill the People of *England* are not content that he ſhould Rule over them. Let him remain *the Servant of the King!* Let him enjoy his Confidence, and Favour, and adminiſter to him "*the Comforts*" of his Converſation; but let him no longer continue *the Servant of the State!* He is weighed in the Balance, and found light; and the Sentence of Reprobation is gone forth againſt him.

If it ſhould be objected to this, that the King has a Right to chuſe his own Servants, the Anſwer is ready.

In the Conſtitution of the *Britiſh* Government, the *executive Power* is veſted *ſolely* in the King.

As this Power is too extenſive to be exerted *perſonally* by him, he has arranged the Objects of it in ſeveral Departments, which he delegates to the Care of Servants, but under his own Inſpection, the Power ſtill remaining virtually in his Hands; and every Tranſaction of theirs being in the Intendment of the Law, performed by him.

The Neceſſity of this Delegation being evident, it is acknowledged in the Conſtitution, and Proviſion made for the Payment of ſuch Servants, who thus become the Servants (though not immediately) of the *State*; and are implicitly ſubject to it's Authority, if not for actual Appointment,

or Amoval, yet moſt certainly for Approbation and Continuance.

This is ſo clear, that it ſcarcely requires Proof. The Buſineſs, which the King employs thoſe Servants to execute, is, immediately the Buſineſs of the State; (that is, *of the People*) and the Revenues with which that Buſineſs is tranſacted by them, under him, are alſo the voluntary and conditional Gifts of the People, granted to the King, expreſly, for that particular Buſineſs, and the Application of them to be accounted for, to the Granters, by him. Would it not then be an Affront to Reaſon, to aſſert that the People have not a Right to object to Servants entruſted thus with their moſt important Concerns, and to whom they literally pay the Wages of their Service?

To appoint his Servants is the undoubted Right of the King; nor do the People pretend to interfere with it; but it is alſo as undoubtedly the Right of the People to object to any of thoſe Servants, whom they find improper for ſuch a Truſt;

a Right which they have often exerted with Succeſs, and can never loſe but with the Loſs of their Liberty; and, I may boldly add, *a Right, the indiſpenſible Obligation on the King to obſerve which is proved by this; that it has never been infringed in a ſingle Inſtance, and A Miniſter ſupported by the Sovereign, in Oppoſition to the Senſe of his People, without making the Reign of that Sovereign unhappy at Home, and inglorious Abroad.*

In Oppoſition to theſe plain, and concluſive Proofs, the Advocates for *the Prime Miniſter* alledge only a palliative Appeal to the Paſſions, to give Weight to which they confound, by the moſt diſingenuous Art, Characters abſolutely diſtinct from each other.

* " If a King of *Great Britain* (ſay " they) is not to be permitted to chuſe his " own Servants, or to diſcard them; to " be grateful for their Fidelity, and Acti- " vity in the public Buſineſs; and to judge " of their Inclinations and Abilities for " ſerving himſelf, and his People; and to

* *Political Conſiderations.*

" honour

" honour with his Countenance and Pro-
" tection thoſe, who merit his Favour, his
" Condition muſt be the moſt miſerable
" upon Earth, to be deprived, meerly be-
" cauſe he is King, of every Comfort a
" private Man holds dear to his Happineſs
" and Intereſts."——

Theſe, My Lord, are their own Words; but plauſible and affecting as this Appeal may appear, it will loſe all its Force, as ſoon as the Fallacy on which it is founded, is expoſed to View.

There are in the King of *Great-Britain* two diſtinct Characters, his *Political*, and his *Perſonal*. In the Latter, he moſt undoubtedly has a Right, " to chuſe his own
" Servants, or to diſcard them; to be
" grateful for their Fidelity and to judge
" of their Inclination and Abilities for
" ſerving himſelf."—But to argue from this to his *Political* Character, and confound *the Servants of his Perſon*, with thoſe whom he employs to do *the Buſineſs of the State*; or in other Words, the Servants of *the King*, with thoſe of *the Crown*; is a manifeſt

manifeſt Sophiſm, and intended only to deceive.

With the former his *private* Happineſs in his *perſonal* Capacity may very poſſibly be connected; and to interfere in the Authority, here claimed over them, would be to break in upon the natural Rights of Humanity; but in Regard to the Latter, the Caſe is quite different. They are not within the Verge of that domeſtic Familiarity, which in the neceſſary Intercourſe of *Perſonal* Service in ſome Reſpects ſeems to reſtore the Sovereign and Subject, to the Equality of their common Nature, and conſtitutes *the Comforts*, whoſe Loſs is ſo pathetically (and modeſtly) lamented in this Appeal.

The ſtrongeſt and moſt recent Inſtances may be brought to ſupport what is here advanced, of the eſſential Diſtinction between *Perſonal* and *Political* Service, if ſelf-evident Reaſon can require any Support.

There have been *Servants of the King*, who have held the moſt lucrative, and honourable Employments *about his Perſon*,

and

and *enjoyed his Favour* in the higheſt Degree, without giving any Offence to the People, though they were known to be unqualified for the more complicated Buſineſs of the State, *becauſe they interfered not with that Buſineſs*; as on the other Hand, there have been *Servants of the Crown* who have tranſacted the moſt difficult Affairs to their Maſter's Honour, and the Satisfaction of the People, at the ſame Time that it was too evident, *they were perſonally diſliked by him*; and can Impropriety or Hardſhip be alledged in either Caſe?

That the King ſhould have a grateful Senſe of the Fidelity of his Servants is but natural, and argues a Virtuouſneſs of Diſpoſition, which it would be the higheſt Misfortune to all his Subjects, that he ſhould want; but this Gratitude muſt not be carried too far nor miſlead his Judgment ſo as to make him think them qualified to be *Servants of the Crown*, becauſe they pleaſe him in their Service *about his Perſon*. AN ERROUR THAT HAS OFTEN BEEN ATTENDED WITH THE MOST UNHAPPY CONSEQUENCES.

To

To *the univerſal Voice of the People* the Advocates for *the* Miniſter oppoſe *the Determination of their repreſentative Body*, by which, according to their Way of Reaſoning, the People is ſo abſolutely concluded that it is a Violation of the Conſtitution for them to attempt interfering *Perſonally*, by offering their Opinion, in any Matters, relating to the Government; and therefore as the Conduct of *the* Miniſter has been approved of by that Repreſentative, it is not neceſſary for him to pay any Reſpect to the Sentiments of the People themſelves, which conſtitutionally have no juſt Weight, nor are entitled to any Regard.

In Order to make a juſt Eſtimate of the Force of this Argument, it will be neceſſary, My Lord, to trace the Conſtitution, from it's firſt Principles, to it's preſent Form.

In Diſquiſitions of this Nature, Freedom is indiſpenſibly neceſſary to the Elucidation of Truth! the Principles of Religion are

examined

examined by divine Command to confirm Faith.

In the Confuſion of Times of continual War, when Kingdoms were the Reward of Conqueſts, it was the Policy of the conquering Powers to divide their Acquiſitions among their military Chiefs, to keep the Natives in Subjection, and have their own Forces always collected, and ready for any ſudden Occaſions, which Forces conſiſted of the Followers of thoſe Chiefs, whom they armed and brought into the Field, at their own Expence; for War was not then a particular Trade, but every Subject was a Soldier, going from the Plough to Battle, and returning again, when it was over, to the very few Arts of ſuch an unſettled State.

Theſe, and ſome perſonal Services to their Kings, were the Titles by which the Chiefs held their Lands, and comprized the greateſt Part of their Duty of Subjection.

Under theſe Chiefs the Lands were again ſubdivided between their own Soldiers, and Officers of inferior Rank, and the Natives; but on very different Terms.

The Former held them of the Chiefs, by Services of a ſimilar Nature, to thoſe which the Chiefs paid to the Kings, and were *free* from every other Kind of Subjection to them; the Latter on the Contrary, were in a State little differing from Slavery, tilling the Ground for their Maſters, and following them to the Wars, for a bare Maintainance, which was all that was allowed to themſelves, without any Right to acquire private Property or poſſibility of recovering Liberty, but by the expreſs Conſent, and actual Concurrence, of their Chiefs, except in ſome extraordinary Caſes, and deſcending from Generation to Generation with the Lands as Part of the Inheritance. Theſe Chiefs were called *Lords*, and the others *Villeins*.

In the rude Original of the *Britiſh* Conſtitution, theſe Lords had an hereditary

Share

Share in the Government, in Right of their Lands, and made an Eſtate, which has ſince been improved into the preſent *Peerage*.

The great Influence, which ſuch an unlimited Authority over the People gave to the Lords, often produced the moſt dangerous Conſequences, by enabling them to reſiſt indiſcriminately the Authority of their Sovereigns, as Views of private Intereſt or Ambition urged them.

To remedy this, Reaſon ſuggeſted it to the governing Powers to reſtore the People to the Rights of Nature, and give them a Share in that Government, of which they were the Strength; that they might form a proper Balance to the Lords.

To obviate the Inconveniencies, which muſt inevitably attend the People's exerciſing this Share in the Government, in their *collective* Body, it was inſtituted that they ſhould *elect* a certain Number from among themſelves, to *repreſent* the Whole,

and whoſe Determinations ſhould be concluſive upon them.

That this *repreſentative* Body ſhould anſwer the Intent of its Inſtitution, it was indiſpenſibly neceſſary that it ſhould conſiſt only of ſuch Perſons as were *free* from the Authority of the Lords.

As the moſt effectual Proviſion to ſecure this *Freedom* of the Repreſentatives, it was appointed that they ſhould be *elected* only by thoſe, who were themſelves *free* alſo; as it could not be ſuppoſed that *free* Men ſhould ever intruſt their moſt Sacred Intereſts to the Care of thoſe, who were not *free*, as by this *Election* they evidently did to their Repreſentatives.

Theſe *free* Men, who at firſt conſiſted almoſt ſolely of the Soldiers, and inferiour Officers of the Conquerours, to whom Lands had been granted under the Lords, as has been obſerved before, were now in a Courſe of Years, conſiderably increaſed in Number; many of the Natives having recovered their

Freedom

Freedom on various Occaſions; but ſtill this Number was greatly inferiour to that of thoſe who were not *Free*.

As Property alone could give that *Independency*, which was evidently the Reaſon for *limiting* the Right of Election to *free* Men; and as all Property then conſiſted in Lands, that Right was annexed to a certain Amount of ſuch Property, as in thoſe Times was eſteemed ſufficient to ſupport the Poſſeſſor, in the neceſſary Degree of Independency; and to certain *Qualifications*, which were eſteemed equivalent to ſuch Property.

In Conſequence of theſe Inſtitutions, no Man was admitted to join in electing a Repreſentative for a *County*, who did not hold Lands in that County, to that Amount, by a Right, which was not determinable at the Will of another, or at any known Time; nor for a *Burrough*, who did not either hold ſuch Lands, within the Precincts of that Burrough, or was acknowledged to enjoy his *Freedom* in it, by an authentic Record; which latter Privilege was given to Burroughs

roughs *(or Towns)* to encourage Peoples living together, for the Advancement of Induſtry and Trade; and it was not to be ſuppoſed, that this Acknowledgement would be given to any, who had not a viſible Probability of Living in a State of Independency. The Former of theſe were called *Free Holders*; the Latter ſimply *Free Men*.

Theſe wiſe Precautions had the deſired Effect, and the Repreſentative of the People ſoon aroſe to that great Importance in the State, which their Strength naturally entitled them to.

But as the Wiſdom of Man is not capable of making any Proviſions, which ſhall invariably comprehend all the various Changes, wrought by Time, it can not be imputed to want of Reſpect to the Conſtitution, to enquire whether theſe Precautions are ſufficient to produce the ſame Effects at preſent, when the Circumſtances, on which they were principally formed, are ſo eſſentially altered.

The

The Improvements of Induſtry, in more ſettled Times, the Acquiſitions of Commerce, and the Diſcoveries made in the Purſuit of it, have introduced a new Kind of Property, unknown to the Modellers of the Conſtitution, and which, therefore, they could make no Proviſion for; at the ſame Time, that the Increaſe of Money has diminiſhed its Value, and the Luxury inſeperable from Opulence, multiplied the Wants of Mankind to ſuch a Degree, as to make the preſent Appointment of Charity calculated for the bare Subſiſtence of a *Pariſh-Beggar*, amount to many Times the Sum, which was then judged ſufficient to eſtabliſh the Independency of an *Elector*.

When theſe Circumſtances are conſidered, can it be unreaſonable to ſuppoſe, that if the ſage Legiſlators, who fixed the Value of the Property, neceſſary to ſupport that Independency at ſuch a Sum of Money, could have foreſeen this Change, they would have made ſome Proviſion for enlarging that Property, in Proportion as the

Cauſes

Cauſes above-mentioned diminiſhed it's Value, and conſequently it's Effect; and have judged the Poſſeſſors of this new Property ſufficiently *free*, and *independent*, to have ſhared in the *Right* of *electing* Repreſentatives, and of ſufficient Conſequence to merit being *repreſented?*—That 40,000l. for Inſtance, lent to the Government, ſhould make a Man as independent of all undue Influence, as Forty Shillings a Year, in Free-hold Eſtate; and that a Gentleman, who ſhould expend an affluent Income in Hoſpitality; or a Merchant, who ſhould afford Support to the ſeveral Trades in a Town, and add to the Wealth of the Community, ſhould be as proper to join in electing the Repreſentatives of that Town, as one of thoſe Tradeſmen, whoſe utmoſt Induſtry could barely earn him a Subſiſtence; and, who after a Life, worn out in Poverty, might poſſibly be brought to the Place of Election, from a Work-houſe, where he had been long ſupported by public Charity?

Or would it have been conſiſtent with that Equity, which ſo evidently appears to have

have been the Foundation of all their Inſtitutions, that thoſe, whoſe *Independency* (the original and ſole Motive for limiting the Right of Election) was eſtabliſhed on Property, in many Inſtances, many Thouſand Fold greater than that appointed by this Inſtitution, ſhould be made to *depend* for the very Enjoyment of that Property, on the Determinations of a Repreſentative, in the electing of which, they were not permitted to ſhare?

And might not their Wiſdom have apprehended, that this very Limitation might, in theſe Circumſtances, be a Means of deſtroying that *Independency*, which it was appointed to ſupport; and give an Opportunity of gaining an Influence, as unconſtitutional, and dangerous, as the Authority of the Lords, over *a few indigent Electors*, which could never be attempted with any Proſpect of Succeſs, over *the opulent and numerous Body of the whole People.*

That to preſerve this *Independency*, was the *ſole* Motive for *limiting the Right of Election originally*, is inconteſtibly proved,

(if what is intuitively evident to Reaſon can require Proof?) by this, that in the Charters granted to ſeveral Burroughs, where the Lords, at the Time of granting them, had no ſuch Power, as it was deſigned to guard againſt, the Right of Election was given to all the Inhabitants in general, without any ſuch Limitation to *Free-holders*, and *Free-men*.—Why the ſame Liberty is not extended to the Inhabitants of all, (due Regard being had to all Diſqualifications particularly appointed) now that the Reaſon againſt it is univerſally removed, I do not preſume to inquire.

I muſt not from this be underſtood to preſume at finding Fault with the preſent Form of the Conſtitution. As I have ſaid in another Inſtance, I revere, becauſe I know it's Excellence; nor has any Subject of *Great-Britain*, an higher Senſe of the Dignity, and Authority, of the Repreſentative Body of the People, than I have. All I contend for is, to ſhew by this candid Diſcuſſion of the Principles of that Conſtitution, that a conſiderable Part of the People, which is now excluded

from

from all Share in the Government, was not in the true Spirit and Reaſon of them intended to ſuffer any ſuch Excluſion, and that, though it is *legally* bound by the Reſolutions of the preſent Repreſentatives, yet in Conſequence of that Excluſion it can not juſtly be ſaid to be *repreſented*, or to have it's Senſe expreſſed by them.

That theſe *Non Electors* are really a conſiderable Part of the People will not be denied by any one, who is acquainted with the preſent State of theſe Kingdoms, and knows the Diſproportion between them, and the *Electors*, in any one Burrough or County in *Great Britain*, in which the *Non Electors* make ſo great a Majority, that they may almoſt be ſaid to be the whole People.

And ſhall ſuch a Body not be permitted to ſpeak their Sentiments, as they are excluded from electing Repreſentatives to ſpeak for them? — Shall they be ſet at nought by Servants, whoſe Wages are paid out of their Property?——And does

this *legal* Incapacity of *Electing* ſink them entirely beneath the Attention of a Government, of which they are the Strength ?—

I have thus, My Lord, proved, as I humbly conceive, both the Poſitions advanced in the Beginning of this Letter, " *that the Office of a Prime Miniſter is* " *inconſiſtent with the Principles of this* " *Conſtitution,*"—And, " *that the Manner* " *in which that Office is at this Time* " *executed is alſo inconſiſtent with the Prin-* " *ciples of ſound Policy, and the eſſential* " *Intereſts of theſe Kingdoms.*"—And in the Courſe of the Arguments alledged for this Purpoſe, have likewiſe evinced, on the Principles of the Conſtitution, *the Right of the People, in their general Body to declare their Sentiments in Matters of public Concern*; as well as ſhewn *the indiſpenſible Obligation on their Governours, to pay regard to that Right !* Will your Grace now give me leave to treſpaſs on you for a Moment longer, while I preſume in the over-flowing of my Heart, to point out the proper

Means

Means of redreſſing the Evils here complained of.

As *uniting* the Efficacy of all the great Offices under the Crown, *unconſtitutionally* and *improperly* in the Hands of ONE, is the Cauſe of the People's Diſcontent, the natural Way to remove that Diſcontent is to *divide* that Power between many.

Nor are there a ſufficient Number of Perſons wanting, to whom theſe Offices may be intruſted, with Safety, and Satisfaction; whoſe Abilities have been found equal to that Charge; and their Fidelity tried, in Days of Difficulty, and Doubt; who have not changed with the Seaſons, nor diſſembled their Sentiments, to ſerve their Intereſt; and who are ready to ſupport with their Lives *the Principles of that Revolution*, in accompliſhing which, their Fathers had the Glory to ſhare; and from whence are derived the greateſt Bleſſings, now enjoyed by *Britons*.

For ſome Offices in particular there are certain Perſons, who ſeemed marked out by Heaven.

There

There is one, whoſe Genius has directed him to ſeek for Glory on that Element, which Heaven has made the peculiar Scene of *Britain*'s Triumphs; and whoſe opening Abilities fill the Hearts of all her faithful Sons, with the happieſt Preſages! Let the Navy be aſſigned to his Care! Let *Britain*'s Thunder ſhake the trembling Shores, from Pole to Pole, under his Command!

There is another, who has led her Armies, with immortal Honour in the Field; who proved the hereditary Courage of his Soul, and ſealed his Attachment to the Liberties of Mankind with his Blood at *Dettingen*; who gathered Lawrels at *Fontenoy*, which made the Victors bluſh; and whoſe Conduct at *Culloden* fixed the Foundation of his Father's Throne ſo firmly, that Faction or Rebellion could never ſhake it more, on that important Day, when many, who have now crept into its Shadow, and baſk in the Smiles of Favour, watched, panting with impious Hope for its Fall. Let the Sword be given into his experienced Hand again! Let him command that Army,

which

which was formed by his Care, and confeſſedly owes its Triumphs in every Quarter of the Globe, to the Excellence of his Inſtitution!

Thus ſhall the Military Power of *Britain*, entruſted by its Sovereign to the Conduct of thoſe, whom Nature has bound inſeperably to his Intereſt, and Heaven made ſtrong for his Service, be a Terrour to her Enemies, and a Safeguard to her happy Sons.

By this *conſtitutional* Diſtribution, all Jealouſies will be removed, and that Harmony between the *Governours*, and *Governed*, which bleſſed the happy Evening of the late Father of his People, and made their Hearts bleed for his Loſs, he reſtored; while *the Supreme Power ſhall be exerted* SOLELY *by the King himſelf*; and all the Emoluments of Government flowing regularly from his Royal Hand, bind the Souls of his Subjects in the Adamantine Chains of Gratitude to the Sacred Diſpenſer of their Happineſs; nor will any Miniſter have an Opportunity to ſtrengthen himſelf in his

Power,

Power, by bribing the Repreſentatives of the People, with the proſtituted Favours of the Crown, till he ſhall think himſelf able both to deſpiſe the People themſelves, and inſult his Sovereign.

To make ſome Attonement for the Errours which may be in this Letter, I ſhall conclude it with a Prayer, in which I am ſure there is none, and know I ſhall be ſincerely joined by your Grace, and every faithful Friend of *Britain*.

May evil Counſellours be removed from before the Throne, and the Power of the King, be eſtabliſhed forever in the Confidence of his People! And may his Sacred Family, always united in itſelf, be planted in theſe Kingdoms, as firmly as the Foundations of the Hills, and flouriſh to the End of Ages, like the Green Bay-tree! And let all the People ſay, AMEN.

I am, My Lord, &c.

POST-

POSTSCRIPT.

SINCE I wrote the above, I find, My Lord, that the Advocates for *the Miniſter* endeavour to evade the Objection of *General Diſlike*, in one of it's moſt ſtriking Inſtances, by alledging that, if ſeveral Perſons of high Rank have reſigned the moſt honourable and lucrative Employments, rather than ſerve under ſo *unconſtitutional* an Office, executed by ſo *exceptionable* a Perſon, others of equal Rank have accepted of them, ſo that the Weight in the general Balance is equal.

The Force of this Reaſoning will ſoon appear. *Private Intereſt* is confeſſed to be too generally the Motive of human Action. Where a Perſon, therefore, acts conſiſtently with this Motive, it cannot be unjuſt to aſcribe his Actions to it; whereas on the Contrary, where a Perſon acts deliberately in direct Oppoſition to his private Intereſt, Juſtice demands that ſuch Actions ſhould be aſcribed to an higher Motive; and conſequently thoſe Reſignations, which could

proceed only from Principle, prove a fixed Diſlike, while the Sincerity of the Approbation argued for from the Acceptance of the others, is juſtly to be doubted, and it's Continuance not to be depended on; as *Intereſt* may change, but *Principle* can not.

If it be ſaid, that the great Fortunes of ſome, who have thus liſted themſelves under *the Miniſter*, raiſe them above the Influence of ſo mean a Motive, it muſt be remembered, that where Avarice has taken Poſſeſſion of the Soul, it's Force increaſes with the Increaſe of it's Acquiſitions, and graſps ſtill at more; or let *Ambition*, which too often over-balances Reaſon, in youthful Minds, be ſubſtituted in the Place of *Intereſt*, in the Argument, and the Concluſion, will be the ſame.

F I N I S.

ERRATA.

P. 7. l. 15. *for* difficult, *read* delicate.
P. 30. l. 18. *for* 13th, *read* 3d.

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
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